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Abstract 
This article pr&s information on the 
conference Synergy in Early Warning 
organizd recently by the Prevention/ 
Early Warning Unit in Toronto, 
Canada. Included are: background on 
the issues, a brief outline with the ab- 
stracts of the papers delivered and the 
contact addresses of the authors. 
Cet article fournit des informations sur 
le coNoque Synergie en Alerte P r h -  
tive organisd rdcemment par 1'Unite' 
Prt?vention/Alerte Prhentive de To- 
ronto, Canada. Yfigurent: l'historique 
des problknes, un synopsis du colloque 
incluant les rdsuds des communica- 
tions prdsentdes, et les adresses permet- 
tant de contacter les auteurs. 
Objectives 
In June of 1995, the G-7 summit in 
Halifax called for the exploration of the 
means by which to improve the analy- 
sis of humanitarian disasters and the 
utilization of conflict-related early 
warning information, noting that the 
issue was not the collection of more 
information, but the enhancement of 
analytical capacity, as well as the proc- 
Dr. Susanne Schmeid1,fonner coordinator of the 
Preuention/Early Warning Unit, Centre for 
Refugee Studies, Ymk University, is currently a 
consultant with UNHCR, and as of September 
1997, Assistant Professor of Sociology, 
American University in Washington, D.C. 
Howard Adelman is a Pr@ssor of Philosophy at 
Ymk University, Toronto. He was thefounder 
and Director of the Centrefir Refugee Studies 
until 1993, and most recently headed its Early 
W a r n i n f l r m t w n  Unit. 
ess of making analyses available to 
decision makers. In response to this 
call, and numerous other within the 
UN and outside, we organized a con- 
ference on the Synergy in Early Warn- 
ing on March 15-18, 1997. This 
conference focused on three types of 
synergies in establishing an early 
warning network: integrating diverse 
research methods, combining the or- 
ganizational efforts of academics, 
states, international agencies and 
NGOs, and connecting analyses to 
strategic responses. This linkage of re- 
search, organization, and response 
will contribute to the early detection, 
and prevention or mitigation of deadly 
conflicts. The focus was on intrastate 
rather than interstate conflicts. 
The conference brought together 
leading academics, policy makers, and 
representatives of relevant interna- 
tional organizations and NGOs. The 
integration of policy responses with 
analysis was intended to increase the 
capacity of early warning analyses to 
be sensitive to the needs of policy mak- 
ers and provide them with specific 
tools and options. 
Initially, the conference tried to ad- 
dress the current split between quanti- 
tative and qualitative early warning 
analyses. By bringing together re- 
searchers from both methodological 
spheres, as well as those academics 
that have already tried to bridge this 
gap, the best qualities of both types of 
research can be combined. While 
quantitative analysis can furnish the 
necessary comparative breadth 
needed for understanding similar 
structural components of crises, quali- 
tative work provides the contextual 
ewly warning analyses and policy re- 
sponses. Too often, early warning is 
adertaken without considering the 
r age  of possible responses. The ab- 
sence of well developed policy options 
makes it difficult for policy makers to 
aQt upon the findings of such analyses. 
Rplationship @ Past, Current and 
hoposed Rwarch 
This conference built on a series of 
wmkshops held over several years at 
the Centre for Refugee Studies (1991, 
1992, 1993) bp Professor Howard 
Aidelman, the Qenter for International 
Dkvelopment and Conflict Manage- 
ment at the University of Maryland 
(11993, 1996) by Professor Robert Ted 
GLUT and Dr. Jahn Davies, the Depart- 
ment of Foreigp Affairs and Interna- 
tional Trade, Ottawa (1996), and the 
Mershon Center for International Se- 
M t y  at Ohio State University (1996) 
by Professor Ji Craig Jenkins. These 
past workshops generally focused 
only on certain parts of early warning 
analysis, such & quantitative/qualita- 
tiwe modelling #nd data systems, with- 
out fully atteinpting to bridge the 
qilantitative/qtualitative gap, the or- 
ganizational ispues and the analyses/ 
response linkhges. This conference 
sought to brid e these gaps. t Initial early warning efforts, par- 
tiicularly in thp eighties, focused on 
humanitarian disasters and concen- 
was aimed at 
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requires; detailed analysis of three *a- 
jor dimensions: actors, situations, ahd 
contexts. Successful early warning also 
requires a suitable ~r~anizatiodal  
structure and a specific focus on realis- 
tic strategic options. 
Numerous efforts are underw~ay 
worldwide to develop early war&g 
models. Some utilize indicators a d  
quantitative models. Others are ba*d 
simply on sharing field informatilon 
available from UN agencies and 
NGOs. Participants in this confere~ce 
utilized different methodologies d 
approaches (qualitative analysis T r -  
sus quantitative computerized cqd- 
ing), in such areas as humanitarw 
crises, major armed conflicts, geno- 
cide/politicide, refugee migrations, 
and human rights. Much less devkl- 
oped, however, is research on linking 
responses to early warning signqls. 
The conference tried to bridge this glap 
by having focused two days exclu- 
sively on the linkbetween research a$-td 
responses and viable policy option$. 
Despite past efforts, an integrated 
early warning approach does not $et 
exist. More recently, however, under 
the auspices of International Alert,, in 
particular the leadership of Kuqar 
Rupesinghe, Ted Gurr and Haywqrd 
Alker, specialists in indicator resear*, 
are applying their combined talents to 
a series of restricted comparative cdse 
studies using a model proposed by 
Alexander George of Stanford Univer- 
sity. While their work does attempt to 
incorporate the issue of responses, strylc- 
turd and organizational issues are s w  
largely overlooked. This conference was 
an attempt tointegrate all of these issues. 
The Criteria Used to Select 
Program Participants 
Guest speakers were selected on tjhe 
basis of international recognition I in 
early warning research and policy itn- 
plementation, and their contributipn 
to early warning analysis and te- 
sponse. The most prominent scholaps, 
key decision makers and NGO leaders 
were selected as guest speakers. Diver- 
sity in background and regional oriefin 
was also taken into account in ordefi to 
provide a balanced conference. I 
Synergy in Early Warning 
Conference: Brief Outline and 
Abstracts of the Papers 
Day 1--Sunday, March 16, lW- 
A. Synergy in Early Warning 
Research 
A-I. Linking Early Warning and 
Intelligence 
"Defining Humanitarian Early 
Warning'' 
Howard Adelman 
York Centre for International and 
Strategic Studies, York University 
York Lanes, 3rd Floor, 4700 Keele 
Street, North York, ON, M3J 1P3 
Canada 
Phone: (416) 736-5156 
(416) 533-5012 (h) 
Fax: (416) 736-5752 
(416) 533-3144 (h) 
Email. hadeIman@yorku.ca 
A lot of effort worldwide is underway 
to create a system of knowledge and 
programmatic action based on a con- 
cept that may be vague and totally 
ambiguous-namely "early warning." 
What is humanitarian early warning 
about? What benefit does it bring, and 
how is early warning to be accom- 
plished? We can refer to the long asso- 
ciation between early warning and 
traditional intelligence services which 
were expected to deliver warnings to 
their politicalmasters insufficient time 
for the political leadership of a state to 
undertake preemptive action to pre- 
vent, deter or, at the very least, miti- 
gate the effects of threatened violent 
action against one's own state. In the 
last two decades, early warning has 
been associated with humanitarian 
actions rather than protecting against 
threats to one's country's security. I do 
not propose to rehearse the develop- 
ment of the concept as it started in hu- 
manitarian efforts to anticipate food 
shortages to enable supplies to be put 
in place to prevent famine, or the ex- 
tension of the term to anticipating refu- 
gee flows in order to have food and 
medical supplies as well as tents and 
water in position to mitigate the suffer- 
ing of the refugees who generally flee 
with minimal supplies, and its more 
latter extension to conflict manage- 
ment to prevent the circumstances 
which give rise to refugee flows in the - 
first place. Instead, Ipropose to subject 
the definition adopted by FEWER, the 
Forum for Early Warning and Early 
Response, to a critical examination to 
unpack its meaning. 
"Intelligence and Early Warning: 
Lessons from a Case Studyw 
Gabriel Ben Dor 
Department of Political Science 
University of Haifa 
Mt. Carmel, 31999 Haifa 
Israel 
Phone: 04 240050 02 240050 
04 240599 
Fax: 04 8240050 
Email: rspc750@uvm.haifa.ac.il 
The paper, using the example of the 
February 25,1994 shooting spree by an 
Israeli doctor in a Muslim Prayer Hall 
in the city of Hebron, tries to answer 
the question if intelligence should be 
expected to predict violent events with 
damaging impact on politics in the fu- 
ture. The case resulted in hearings and 
deliberatipn that raised certain points 
of controversy that provide an excel- 
lent case study of early warning, and 
its link to intelligence. This study ad- 
dresses itself to these points, based on 
a study of the material available by the 
Shamgar Commission, as reported in 
open sources. No particular distinction 
is made between the main themes in 
the hearings on the one hand, and the 
conclusions and recommendations on 
the others, as there are no major gaps 
between them. In addition, particular 
attention is paid to the linkages be- 
tween intelligence and early warning, 
which is a natural theme emerging 
from the proceedings. 
"Potential Humanitarian Crises: 
The Warning Process and Roles for 
Intelligence" 
Mary 0. McCarthy 
National Security Council 
The White House 
Washington, D.C. 20504 
USA 
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? Phone: (202) 456-9341 
Fax: (202) 856-9340 
Warning is a process of communicat- 
L ing judgments about threats early 
enough for decision makers to take 
action to deter whatever outcome is 
threatened; or failing that, to manage 
events in such a way that the worst 
consequences are mitigated. So in a 
sense, then, the term "early warning" 
is redundant; warning that comes too 
late for action is not warning at all. In- 
telligence plays a role at each stage in 
the warning process but it is not intel- 
ligence in the traditional sense of steal- 
ing or discovering "secrets" that is 
relevant here. Rather, the intelligence 
needed in these cases is really informa- 
tion and news. The information may 
be rather obscure and difficult to ob- 
tain, but rarely will the task of divert- 
ing or managing a humanitarian crisis 
depend on discovering secrets. Still, as 
crises develop, international organiza- 
tions and NGOs are likely to continue 
to turn to governments for what they 
willcal18'intelhgence" on the situation. 
This will continue to be true because 
only governments will have the re- 
sources devoted to collecting and ana- 
lyzing the array of information 
available. Thus, if warning is to be ef- 
fective, the budding synergy between 
governments and NGOs will have to 
blossom as governments and intema- 
tional organizations help provide 
NGOs with a broad perspective on the 
crisis and NGOs provide governments 
with ground truths on areas to which 
their officials do not have access. 
A-11. Quantitative Modelling and 
Computerized Coding 
"Pattern Recognition for Early 
Warning: Crisis Classification using 
Event Data and Hidden Markov 
Models" 
Philip A Schrodt 
Department of Political Science 
University of Kansas, 504 Blake Hall 
Lawrence, KS 66045 
USA 
Phone: (913) 864-9024 
Fax: (913) 864-5700 
Email: pschrodt6hkans.edu 
Event data are one of the most widely 
used indicators in quantitative early 
warning research. To date, most of the 
models using event data have con- 
structed numerical indicators of the 
likelihood and severity of a crisis. 
These measures are somewhat arbi- 
trary and have yet to gain wide accept- 
ance in the policy community. An 
alternative approach is to use compu- 
terized pattern recognition techniques 
to match an existing crisis to a set of 
similar historical cases, and use those 
historical cases to judge the likely se- 
verity of the current situation. This 
approach has much in common with 
the techniques used by human ana- 
lysts-who frequently employ reason- 
ing by historical analogy-while 
preserving the advantages of the 
inexpensive and systematic moni- 
toring that is possible using con- 
temporary methods of automatically 
generating event data from newswire 
reports. This paper reports on a project 
that uses "Hidden Markov models," a 
recently developed sequence-com- 
parison technique that is widely used 
in computational speech recognition, 
to measure similarities among intema- 
tional crises. The model is developed 
using the "Behavioural Correlates of 
War" data set of historical crises, then 
applied to political behaviour in the 
contemporary Middle East. 
"Mapping Mass Political Conflict 
and Civil Society: Issues and 
Prospects for the Automated 
. Development of Event Data" 
Doug Bond (Harvard University), 
J. Craig Jenkins (The Ohio State 
University), Charles Taylor (Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State 
University) and Kurt Schock 
(Rutgers University) 
The Center for International Affairs 
Harvard University 
1737 Cambridge Street 
Cambridge, MA 02138 
USA 
Phone: (617) 4957705 
Fax: (617) 49&8!%2 495-8292 
Email: dbondOcfia.harvard.edu 
I 
M+s political conflict is examined 
flically in terms of violence and in 
isolation from routine civil interac- 
tiow. We argue that mass conflict is 
mqltidimensional and that violence 
should be treated as an outcome of 
coslflict, as well as a form of action. We 
define three dimensions of conflict- 
contentiousness, coerciveness, and 
chiknge goals-and indices of the civil 
swiety that are central to mapping glo- 
bal trends in mass conflict. We then 
o w e  a strategy for mapping mass 
coflct and civil interactions using the 
P W A  protocol to generate highly 
rebble event data and then use these 
indices to trace two democratic transi- 
tigns (in Poland and South Korea), a 
conflict crisis that was repressed 
(China) and a conflict escalation that 
flared into a civil war (the former Yu- 
gdslavia). Automation has major ad- 
vantages over human coding in terms 
of transparency, integration with ex- 
isting event data series, real time avail- 
ability and long-term maintenance 
costs. It also opens up new ways of 
thlinking about event data and the as- 
sessment of reliability. 
"Assessing Risks of Ethnorebellion 
in the Year 2000: Three Empirical 
Approaches" 
Will H. Moore (University of Cali- 
farnia) and Ted Robert Gurr (Uni- 
versity of Maryland) 
Department of Political Science 
University of California, Riverside 
P.0. Box 3138, Idyllwild, CA 92549 
USA 
ZfCR voice: (909) 787-6367 
UCR fax: (909) 7873933 
Home voice/ fax: (909) 659-2467 
E!maik will.moore@ucr.edu 
'Ithis paper describes three empirical 
approaches to generating risk assess- 
qents of ethnorebellion from 1991-95 
data on 268 groups surveyed in the 
Iy4inorities at Risk project. The results 
alre compared with one another and, in 
l$gh risk cases, with recent political 
developments. The approaches are 
rbk profiling (based on a priori speafi- 
aation of risk factors), theoretical mod- 
dlling, and empirical modelling, the 
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latter two based on analysis o f  
residuals from regression analysis. we 
distinguish risk assessments from 
early warnings and forecasts. Rawer 
than estimating precise probabilitie~ of 
ethnorebellion, we offer three alteda- 
tive assessments of risks of rebellioq in 
the mid-range future. These assebs- 
ments are expected to hold only if h e  
variables identified in the risk proses 
remain constant-which, in a ch g- 
ing political world, is not likely. 
assessments should be useful beca se 
they identdy key variables and 
+ 
risk cases that warrant monitor' l?' g. 
Such monitoring CAN provide e@ly 
warning, thus our assessments pie- 
vide a foundation for the developmht 
of early warning systems of ethrio- 
political conflict. 
"Accessing and Analysing of E-Mkil 
Reports Through Database 
Systems" 
Valery Stepanov 
Centre for Study and Prevention ofl 
Conflict, Institute of Ethnology and 
Anthropology 
Leninskii Prospect 32a 
117334 Moscow 
Russia 
Phone: (095) 938-0043 
Fax: (095) 938.0043 
Email: anthpub@iea.msk.su I 
The presentation aims to discuss ian 
idea hypertext for improving systqm 
of query statements to database on eN- 
nic conflict topics. The Centre for $e 
Study of Conflict (Institute of Ethnbl- 
ogy and Anthropology, Russian Acqd- 
emy of Sciences) coordinates a 
wide-range email early warnipg 
network. The Centre accumulat$s, 
processes and publishes essential h- 
formation received from more than 120 
geographical areas of the former Soviet 
Union. For this purpose special data- 
base is being developed in the Cen*. 
We describe two main applications flor 
database management. It offers ndw 
opportunities for scholars and pradti- 
tioners in fast overviewing data &d 
generating new ideas. 
A-111. Qualitative Analysis and 
Case Studies 
"Early Warning for North Korean 
Flood Victims at Refugee Risk 
Victims of Nature or Politics?" 
Shin-wha Lee 
Graduate School of International 
Studies, Korea University 
79P.10 Bang-Bae Dong 
Seo-Cho Ku, Choong Ahng Hts Villa, 
#201, Seoul 
South Korea 
Phone: (822) 599-2763 594-2763 
Fax: (822) 599-2763 521-8805 
Email: swlee@kuccnx.korea.ac.kr 
In the event of the recent floods which 
aggravated the seriousness of existing 
food supply problems in North Korea, 
the concerns related to possible insta- 
bility on the Korean peninsula have 
revolved around the possibility of 
North Koreans at refugee risk. The 
need for contingency planning is re- 
quired to prepare for massive refugee 
flows that might result from further 
economic decline and or famine in 
North Korea. Yet, efforts to do every- 
thing possible to halt refugee flows by 
stabilizing the agricultural production 
and feeding people in at-risk areas are 
more desirable, since refugee flows 
mean a following indicator, not a lead- 
ing indicator, of insecurity. The case of 
North Korea, however, represents 
limits of early (or preventive) action 
due to various obstacles such as 
sovereignty, political propaganda 
('Chu-che'), and misinformation. Cit- 
ing the country's food crises initiated 
by natural disasters (floods) and ag- 
gravated by political manipulation, 
this paper will examine: under what 
condition is early detection difficult?; 
under what circumstances are preven- 
tive actions less feasible though the 
early warning models are successful 
and the crises are detected in a timely 
fashion? In the case of North Korea, 
categorizing environmental factors 
alone is not feasible. A comprehensive 
analysis is needed for comparing the 
natural factors causing the country's 
food crisis with the political factors. 
"Early Warning: The Case of the 
Former Soviet Union" i 
Valery Tishkov and Mara Ustinova 
Institute of Ethnology and Anthro- 
pology, Russian Academy of Science 
Leninskii Prospect 32a 
117334 Moscow 
Russia i 
Phone: (7 095) 938-1747 938-1917 
Fax: (7 095) 938-0600 
Email: mara@eawarnl.msk.su 
Early warning of conflicts in the former 
USSR dates its origins to 1993, when 
the Network of Ethnological Monitor- 
ing and Early Warning of Conflict 
(EAWARN) was formed within the 
framework of the international project 
"Ethnic Conflict Management in the 
Former USSR". The project is coordi- 
nated by the Institute of Ethnology and 
Anthropology, Russian Academy of 
Sciences, and Conflict Management 
Group, Harvard Law School, in coop- 
eration with the International Labora- 
tory of Mass Communications 
(VEGA). The project is funded by the 
Carnegie Corporation of New York 
and the Russian Academy of Sciences. 
The EAWARN is A network of leading 
experts in the former Soviet Union, 
including a number of Russia's repub- 
lics and administrative regions with 
multi-ethnic populations and conflict 
situations. The Network is designed to 
monitor ethnopolitics, to collect and 
process information for early detection 
of potential conflicts and early preven- 
tive action. The Founding Director of 
the EAWARN is professor Valery 
Tishkov. Inaugurated onSeptember 1, 
1993, the Network includes over 25 
local expertsnow. The goal of this pres- 
entation is to share the experience of 
building the Network and its develop- 
ment. The following issues will be ex- 
plored: the specific elements of the 
Network's development stages from 
initial information sharing to current 
descriptive analysis of Early Warning 
model, based on 47 indicators; profes- 
sional and personal characteristics of 
the local representatives who gather 
information and their affect on the type 
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of information; use of information col- 
lected for political recommendations. 
"Research of Socio-Psychological 
Factors in a System of Early 
warning" 
Eugeni V. Kritski 
Director, North Caucasian Centre 
Institute for Social and Political 
Research 
Russian Academy of Science 
P.O. Box 63,350048 Krasnodar 
Russia 
Phone: (861-2) 59-14-17 
Emaik kritski@eawarn.kuban.su 
One of the major elements of the early 
warning of ethnic conflicts is the em- 
pirical data collecting through quanti- 
tative research of mass consciousness 
in regions of potential conflict. The re- 
port presents an experience of the 
North-Caucasian Centre of the Insti- 
tute of Social and Political Research of 
Russian Academy of Sciences in study- 
ing socio- and ethno-psychological 
background of the potential conflicts 
in a region of Northern Caucasus. The 
region located in South-West Russia is 
a specific frontier between Western 
and Eastern civilizations and due to 
this fact involved not only in the Rus- 
sian field of geopolitical interests but 
in those of Turkey, Iran, Trans-Cauca- 
sian countries and Muslim world as a 
whole. The structure of the Chechen 
conflict was observed as a phenom- 
enon presented by focal events, in- 
duced directly by contradiction of 
values and interests of fighting sides, 
as well as peripheral events +onse- 
quences determined by catalysing in- 
fluence of open violent conflict in 
Chechnia upon political, social, ideo- 
logical and sociopsychological devel- 
opments in neighbouring republics 
with their own conflictogeneous po- 
tential. Peripheral events could pro- 
vide favourable conditions for 
penetrating "external" conflict and for 
genesis of a new one. In an applied 
quantitative research, we tested a hy- 
pothesis about probable types of be- 
havioural reaction in peripheral 
societies determined by stereotypes of 
the conflict perception (a specific test 
on value compatibility and tolerance 
between different ethnic and social 
groups). The first type of reaction was 
indicated by features of consolidation 
of the peripheral society on the base of 
solidarity with one of the fighting 
sides, which could provoke a conflict 
with another; the second was indicated 
by tendencies to fragmentation of the 
society on the basis of differences in 
conflict perception, which could lead 
to sharpening of social (interethnic) 
relations and transform a 
conflictogeneous situation into con- 
flict. 
A-IV. Synergy of Qualitative 
Studies with Quantitative 
Models 
"Dynamic Data for Conflict Early 
Warning" 
John Davies (University of Maryland) 
and Barbara Harff (U.S. Naval 
Academy) 
Centre for International Develop- 
m$nt and Conflict Management, 
University of Maryland 
0121 Tydings Hall, College Park, 
Maryland 20742-7231 
USA 
Phone: (301) 314-7709 
Fax: (301) 314-9256 
Email: JD7l@umail.umd.edu 
The paper examines the need for sys- 
tematic model-based early warning 
systems, supported by dynamic and 
structural data systems. It introduces 
GEDS as one such dynamic data sys- 
tem and outlines the accelerator cat- 
egories developed by Harff for the use 
in early warning models for genocide 
and ethnic conflict. The paper also re- 
ports some results testing the efficacy 
of such accelerators. 
"Early Warning and Deterrence 
Strategies: States versus 
Institutions" 
David Cannent (Dalhousie Univer- 
sity) and Frank Harvey (Carleton 
University) 
NPSIA, Carleton University 
Level 2A Paterson Hall, 1125 Colonel 
By Drive 
W w a ,  ON, K1S 5B6 
C h d a  
Phone: (613) 520-2600 ext. 6662 
Fa#: (613) 52CL2889 
Ennail: dcarment@ccs.carleton.ca 
There is no definitive evidence on 
when and under what conditions third 
pwties should intervene in a coercive 
way to prevent ethnic tensions from 
escalating out of control, or how to 
manage crises when they do. Nor do 
we clearly understand the conditions 
Uder which deterrent and compellent 
thkeats (or any form of coercive diplo- 
mbcy, for that matter) will succeed or 
fail, or how credibility and resolve are 
inlfluenced by (a) the "type of 
inkervener," (b) "the type of conflict," 
ori (c) the "stage" at which the interven- 
tibn takes place. Even more disturbing 
is the fact that answers to these ques- 
ti@ns are becoming crucial at a time 
when international relations theory is 
being criticised for its lack of cumula- 
tiveness, or, even worse, relevance. 
with respect to deterrence theory, the 
dost widely researched form of coer- 
ciwe diplomacy and the focus of our 
study, there are no clear and consistent 
*dings. Without an empiricalbase to 
eqaluate the conditions under which 
ckrcive diplpmacy is likely to suc- 
ceed, answers to pressing questions 
about the onset, escalation and resolu- 
tibn of ethnic conflict and violence will 
remain elusive. Our paper has three 
imterrelated objectives: 1) to explore 
the nature of ethnic conflict de-escala- 
tion in the context of deterrence theory, 
2) to produce policy relevant informa- 
tion on the success rates of different 
tkpes of third party interventions, 3) to 
assess the impact of "crisis profiles" 
(iethnic/non-ethnic; interstate /intra- 
dtate) on the probability of success, and 
4) to examine the larger implications 
fm early warning and preventive di- 
plomacy. Two propositions are tested 
against crisis data: 1) multistate coali- 
tiions are more likely than unilateral 
interveners, and unilateral interveners 
more likely than IOs, to control hostili- 
ties in both ethnic and non-ethnic cri- 
es ;  2) multistate coalitionS are more 
likely than unilateral interveners, and 
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unilateral interveners are more likqly 
than IOs, to control hostilities in bqth 
interstate and intrastate crises. 
The Systemic-Evolutionary 
Extended Signal Approach" 
Andrea K. Riemer 
Political Consultant 
Veronikagasse 38/230, A-1170 Wi* 
Austria 
Phone/Fax: +43 1 400 17 29 
Emaik smutek@isis.wu-wien.ac.at 
The period after 1989 has been the mpst 
turbulent and erratic since World war 
11. All areas of our society show far 
reaching signs of transformation. We 
are living in an "Age of Discontinuity," 
To analyze and assess discontinuiges 
(global level) and crises (regional levpl) 
which may rise from changes in tihe 
areas of demography, economy, wbl- 
ogy, technology and politics/religiqn, 
the following approach is presenqed 
and applied to the question: "Is the* a 
potential for crisis if ethnic minorit$es 
are not sufficiently integrated into we 
state?" The Kurds have been one of the 
largest minorities in the world for 
years. "Kurds" is a term compris@g 
several groups of clans living in a Pi- 
vided area. By far the largest numkr 
of Kurdish clans live in Turkey. 'lhe 
"Turkish Kurds" have been showinlg a 
high potential for crisis for about W- 
teen years. The conflicts between we 
PKK and the Turkish government +d 
the Army show several features df a 
civil war costing the lives of the ciyil- 
ian population. Moreover, the c o q c t  
has cost Turkey face in the inteqa- 
tional arena as well as a lot of mogey 
(about 6 to 7 million US dollars per 
year). 
"Combining Indicator Research and 
Case-Based Analyses" 
Adeel Ahmed and 
Elizabeth V. Kaesinis 
Department of Humanitarian Affes 
United Nations 
New York, NY 10017 
USA 
Phone: (212) 963-1249 
Fax: (212) 963-1314 
I 
Emaik ahrneda@un.org 
kassinis@un.org 
While it is clear that if crises could be 
prevented, lives and scarce resources 
would be saved, there is much less clar- 
ity with regard to "prevention" as a 
concept and "early warning" as a tool. 
While prevention has proven to be an 
elusive goal, early warning continues 
to receive increased attention, with the 
term used to describe an increasing 
number of different, and differing, ac- 
tivities. For the last three years, the 
United Nations Department of Hu- 
manitarian Affairs (DHA) has been 
struggling to turn early warning from 
a sound concept into a series of 
implementable and fruitful activities. 
This has included defining what early 
warning is; how it can be operational- 
ized; and most importantly, how it can 
be used to initiate early and effective 
action on the part of the UN and the 
humanitarian community. The Hu- 
manitarian Early Warning System 
(HEWS) was established to identify 
crises with humanitarian implications, 
recognizing that the causes of crises are 
as numerous and complex as the im- 
plications themselves. This paper will 
trace the evolution of thinking within 
DHA on the tools, mechanisms, and 
processes needed to accomplish the 
task. In particular, it will examine the 
balance required between indicator 
analysis and case-based research to 
support decision making within an 
organization such as the UN. Striking 
such a balance is critical, in order to 
translate analyzes derived from sys- 
tematic indicator research into viable 
and practical policy options for deci- 
sion makers. 
A-V. The Media and Early 
Warning 
"Propaganda and Genocide" 
Frank Chalk 
Department of History 
Concordia University 
1455 De Maiso~euve Blvd. West 
Montdal, PQ H3G 1M8 
Canada 
Phone: (514) 848-2404 
Fax: (514) 848-4538 
Emaik drfrank@alcor.concordia.ca 
This paper offers a preliminary com- 
parative historical examination of the 
role of state and regime-supported 
propaganda in inciting civilians to im- 
plicate themselves in genocides and 
gross violations of human rights 
through participation and/or acquies- 
cence in killings. Reviewing past cases 
in light of mass participation in the 
Rwanda genocide of 1994, it examines 
the twentieth century genocidal kill- 
ings of Armenians, "kulaks" and 
"bourgeois elements" in the Soviet 
Union, Jews, Indonesian Communists, 
Cambodians, and several groups of 
victims in the former Yugoslavia. Con- 
clusions are drawn regarding the tech- 
niques adopted by the perpetrators to 
demonize the victims, the role of the 
media of the time in mobilizing mass 
support for the killings, and the contri- 
butions of communication theories to 
understanding the circumstances un- 
der which victims become vulnerable 
to propaganda. Questions for future 
research are posed. 
"U.S. Television Network Coverage 
on Humanitarian Crises: Can they 
be a Source of Early Warning?" 
Steven Livingston 
School of Media and Public Affairs 
The George Washington University 
801 22nd Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20052 
USA 
Phone: (202) 994-5888 
Fax: (202) 994-5806 
Emaik sliv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu 
Livingston's remarks will focus on the 
response of American television news 
to humanitarian emergencies. He will 
focus on two interrelated questions: To 
what extent might we reasonably ex- 
pect American television networks, 
including CNN, to serve as a reliable 
source of information regarding nas- 
cent or even extant refugee crises? Sec- 
ondly, what role might media play in 
the humanitarian policy responses of 
the United States government? While 
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considerable expectation is eome!times 
placed in media, particularly televi- 
sion, to serve as response catalysts in 
humanitarian crises, a close and care- 
ful examination of the evidence gar- 
nered from recent humanitarian crises 
suggests prudence in developing these 
expectations. 
"The Media in Conflict Prevention 
and Management: Curse or 
Catalyst?" 
Nilc Gowing 
BBC-Word Television 
London 
England 
Phone: +44-181-225-8119 
Voice: +44-181-576-8137 
Mobile: i-44-802-877-808 
Home: +44-802-741-5083 
Fax: +44-181-287-4427 
Email: 
l005~~.~~~0@CompuServe.com 
Much is expected of the media in con- 
flict prevention and management. The 
reality is different from the expecta- 
tion. Based on new work for the 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing 
Deadly Conflict, this paper analyzes 
the myths of the media's role in early 
warning. How accurate, how partial 
and therefore how credible is real-time 
reporting in the build up to, and pros- 
ecution of a conflict? 
Day %Monday, March 17,1997- 
B. Synergy in Organization 
B-I. Governments and Early 
Warning 
"How to Establish an Early Warning 
System: Concept and First Steps in 
Switzerland" 
Andreas V. Kohlschiitter and 
Giinther Bachler 
Swiss Peace Foundation 
Wasserwerkgasse 7, P.O. Box 
CH-3011 Bern 
Switzerland 
Phone: +413131155 82 
Fax: +413131155 83 
Email: spfbaechler@dial.eunet.ch 
The authom introduce a pilot project 
on a general conflid warning system 
mainly designed to serve the Swiss 
Foreign Ministry. Especially after the 
Rwanda disaster the administration 
(backed by the Foreign Committee of 
the Parliament) underlines the need 
for a computerized system that builds 
the ground for early recognition and, 
thus, enhances the "institutionalized" 
pressure to (re)act in a stage of a con- 
flict as early as possible. Questions 
arise on the state of the art as well as on 
the interface betweenearly warning on 
one hand and decision making and 
early action on the other. 
B-11. The Role of the UN and UN 
Organizations in Early 
Warning 
"Early and Late Warning of Acute 
Conflict by the UN 
Secretary-General" 
A. Walter Dorn 
International Relations Programme 
University of Toronto 
Trinity College, 6 Hoskin Avenue 
Toronto, ON, M5S 1H8 
Canada 
Phone: (416) 978-5217 
Fax: (416) 978-2797 
Email. wdorn@chem.utoronto.ca 
The only political role that was explic- 
itly given to the Secretary-General in 
the UN Charter is early warning. (Un- 
der Article 9gj he/she may bring 
threats to the peace to the attention of 
the Security Council.) But can the UN 
Secretary-General actually succeed in 
providing early warnings? By digging 
into the mines of UN history, I have 
sought to identlfy and tabulate the 
various roles played by the 
Secretary-General, and to highltght the 
instances of early warning. For over 
100 conflicts examined, only a very few 
(e.g., Congo 1960, Bahrain 1970, Mac- 
edonia 1992) can be rigorously classi- 
fied as early warning. These provide 
some useful pointers. The many cases 
of late warning (e.g., Korea 1950, Fa&- 
lands/Malvinas 1982, Namibia 1989) 
can also yield valuable learning. Fur- 
ore, there are only three or four 
ex licit invocations of Article 99 and T
abqut a dozen cases of implied invoca- 
tiow, though most would be consid- 
ered "late" warnings. This paper will 
su4unarize the constraints and oppor- 
tunities for early warning in each of its 
thtlee stages (information gathering, 
andysis and dissemination), and make 
su~gestions about how some obstacles 
can be overcome. For technical and 
political reasons, the UN Secretary- 
General is now in a better position to 
doearly warning than ever before but 
ceflain improvements are still called 
fod: better targeting of desired infor- 
mation, increased intelligence-shar- 
in$, tighter confidentiality systems, 
ea$ier access for on-site observation, a 
swnger analytical capacity (including 
scqmrio building), quicker feedback at 
headquarters and a more proactive 
approach in issuing warnings and un- 
delrtaking response measures. This 
mqy be a tall order at a time when the 
international community seems un- 
willing to increase the UNs staff and 
re$ources but the goal of conflict pre- 
vention is worthy of all such efforts. 
"Early Warning of Violent Conflict: . 
The Role of Observer Missions" 
Major David M. Last 
The Lester B. Pearson Canadian 
Wemational Peacekeeping Training 
Centre 
COmwallis Park, P.O. Box 100 
Clementport, NS, BOS 1EO 
Cgnada 
P$one: (902) 638-8611 ext 144 
F4x: (902) 638-3310 
~ ~ ~ . 0  
Military and civilian observers have 
b@m deployed by the United Nations 
and by Regional Organizations for a 
variety of purposes at various stages in 
the escalation and de-escalation of ten- 
sions. How can observer missions 
ehhance early warning of violent con- 
@ct? Recent observer missions in the 
Blallcans, Africa and Central Asia have 
rehd  heavily on military personnel. 
Rhey have often been deployed after it 
L evident that violent conflict is likely, 
ar is in progress. Often, the informa- 
l 
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tion they provide at considerable rbk 
has added little to the internatiodal 
community's ability to respond to or 
prevent violent conflict. With knodd- 
edge about how conflicts start ahd 
spread, we can link observer missidns 
more effectively to other means of 
early warning. If they are structurdd, 
trained, and deployed to address h e  
many dimensions of incipient vio- 
lence, they can be used to help gal$a- 
nize international response. This qay 
entail linking observer missions I to 
projects like the Forum on Early Wap- 
ing and Emergency Respodse 
(FEWER), to permit mutual suppdrt. 
Adding police, judicial, socioedo- 
nomic, political and media analybis 
elements to observer missions wodld 
increase their capacity to observe ndn- 
military dimensions of incipient cdn- 
flict. Missions might normally be 
structured with military observers in 
support of these elements. ~ r o v i d i h ~  
high-level liaison officers from the db- 
server mission to international bodies 
might allow the international comdu- 
nity to respond more effectively, &d 
lend added credibility to the missiofi's 
activities. In conjunction with intenpa- 
tional bodies, a mission media cpll 
could help shape the international 
view of an emerging crisis, the betted to 
manage response, Observer missiqns 
can help with both early warning apd 
international response to incipient do- 
lent conflict. The next generation of 
observer missions should have multi- 
functional headquarters with analybis 
and assessment units, liaison to intbr- 
national bodies, effective team prepa- 
ration, and realistic media strategiqs. 
"Averting Famine Through Linkiirg 
Early Warning with Response 1 
Mechanisms" 
Abdur Raehid I 
Food and Agriculture Organizatioq 
of the United Nations 
Chief Global Information and ~ a r l t  
Warning Service Commodities an4 
Trade Division, Room D-886 , 
Vide delle Terme di Caracalla , 00100 Rome 
Italy I 
Phone: (39-6) 52 253 099/3144 
Fax: (39-6) 52 254 495 
Emaik abdur.rashid@fao.org 
FAO's Global Information and Early 
Warning System (GIEWS) has been 
assigned the mandate of constantly 
monitoring the Global food supply 
and demand situation and alerting the 
international community to countries 
or regions threatened by serious food 
shortages or which have exceptional 
surpluses of food requiring donor as- 
sistance for disposal. In a period when 
the number and complexity of food 
emergencies has been growing, 
GIEWS continues to provide policy- 
makers and relief agencies throughout 
the world with the most up-to-date 
and accurate information available. 
Yet having an effective early warning 
system is no guarantee that timely and 
adequate interventions will follow. 
Emergency assistance is not always 
mobilized in sufficient volume, or it 
arrives too late to avert famines and 
save lives. However, objective early 
warning information continues to play 
a crucial role in ensuring that timely 
and appropriate action can be taken to 
avoid human suffering and loss of life. 
The paper outlines GIEWS experience 
in linking early warning with response 
mechanisms in some recent food emer- 
gencies. It shows how effective early 
warnings, rapid national/regional co- 
ordination and adequate international 
support have resulted in successful 
relief effort which averted threats of 
famine and saved many lives. 
B-111. The Role of NGOs in Early 
Warning 
"Eyes and Ears? Limits of NGO 
Information for Early Warning" 
William DeMars 
Political Science Department 
The American University in Cairo 
P.O. Box 2511, Cairo, 11511 
Egypt 
Phone: (202) 357-6782 (w) 
Fax: (202) 355-7565 
Emaik wedernars@acs.auc.eun.eg 
Complex humanitarian emergencies 
generate human rights abuse, famine, 
disease and displacement on a massive 
scale, and they are almost invariably 
rooted in civil wars. The link between 
civil war and humanitarian catastro- 
phe was a common factor in Biafra, 
Cambodia, Ethiopia and other Cold 
War disasters, and it remains a feature 
of post-Cold War emergencies as ex- 
emplified by events in Somalia, Bosnia 
and Rwanda. Policy responses to in- 
ternal conflicts have passed through 
several phases since 1989. First, the 
withdrawal of superpower sponsor- 
ship from proxies failed to eliminate 
all civil wars. Next, muscular military 
humanitarianism stumbled in Somalia 
and Bosnia. Finally-and with a de- 
gree of desperation born of growing 
isolationism in public opinion-poli- 
cymakers in governments, the UN and 
' NGOs have turned to "early warning 
and conflict prevention" as a rationale 
for global internationalism at a dis- 
count price. The body of the paper con- 
sists of three sections. It first examines 
the limits of NGO information on in- 
ternal conflicts, and several means to 
overcome those limitations. The next 
section describes recent initiatives to 
share intelligence for early warning in 
policy networks that include NGOs 
and elements of the U.S. national secu- 
rity bureaucracy. The third section 
addresses specific cases and issues of 
such policy networks. 
"NGOs and International Relations 
Theory: The Rwanda Case" 
Janice Stein (University of Toronto) 
and Bruce Jones (London School of 
Economics) 
Department of Political Science 
University of Toronto 
Sidney Smith Hall 
100 St. George Street 
Toronto, ON, M5S 1Al 
Canada 
Phone: (416) 978-1048 978-6758 
Fax: (416) 978-5566 
Email: jstein@chass.utoronto.edu 
The authors analyze the role of NGOs 
in providing early warning of the 
genocide in Rwanda in order to shed 
I 
I 
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light on the strengths and weaknesses 
of NGOs as ringers of warning bells 
generally. The authors begin by argu- 
ing that on the basis of obvious struc- 
tural virtues as organizations, NGOs 
should have some specific advantages 
in the capacity to provide early warn- 
ing. However, the authors conclude 
that the Rwanda experience does not 
indicate that such capacities are in fact 
being employed. In order to capitalize 
on crucial assets NGOs possess in gen- 
eral and, in fact, did possess in 
Rwanda, the NGO community would 
have had to: 1) maintain and deepen its 
connection with local communities 
throughout an emergency which 
sapped NGOs energies and preoccu- 
pied its leadership; and 2) understand 
at both policy and operating levels the 
high value of the assets it had and the 
importance of applying them to inter- 
national processes of early warning. 
B-IV. New Approaches to 
Collaborative Early Warning 
Information, Analyses and 
Network Systems 
"RefWorld ae an Early Warning Tool" 
Udo Jan2 
United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, Information and 
Research Management 
UNHCR/CDR 
Case postale 2500 
CH-1211 Geneva 2 Depot 
Switzerland 
Phone: I-4122 739 85 55 
Fax: +4122 739 73 67 
Email: janz@unhcr.ch 
Reliable information from a variety of 
tested sources within the public do- 
main that have withstood the chal- 
lenge of corroboration and verifiability 
over time, inevitably forms the back- 
bone of any analytical attempt at early 
warning in humanitarian crises situa- 
tions. Speedy access to this informa- 
tion has been considerably enhanced 
over the past years as an increasing 
number of governments, inter-govem- 
mental and non-governmental organi- 
zations make the information they 
generate available through the World 
Wide Web in addition to hard copy dis- 
semination. Although extremely use- 
ful for its currency, the Web does 
however still pose limitations with re- 
gard to carrying out efficient searches 
of less time sensitive information that 
may nevertheless be crucial to assess 
for early warning purposes. Since the 
early 1990~~ UNHCR has embarked on 
a project of converting large amounts 
of critical information relating to the 
international refugee regime, situated 
in the broader human rights context, 
and consisting of legal and country 
information, from hard copy into elec- 
tronic format for dissemination to its 
field offices worldwide and the public 
at large. This project, known as 
RefWorld, has in the meantime come 
to fruitionand the combined databases 
are available already in its 3rd edition 
on CD-ROM since January 1997 with a 
complementary edition available 
through UNHCR's home page on the 
World Wide Web. The end product 
probably constitutes the most compre- 
hensive refugee and human rights in- 
formation resource available to date, 
including many early warning bench- 
mark reports on country situations 
around the world that are not available 
elsewhere in electronic format. 
RefWorld is also the result of unprec- 
edented collaboration among a great 
variety of actors in the humanitarian 
and human rights fields with UNHCR, 
and its success can be attributed to all 
who had the vision and the determina- 
tion to contribute to this endeavour 
even in the face of seemingly insur- 
mountable obstacles. 
"Early Warning and Information: 
The Role of ReliefWeb" 
Sharon Rusu 
Department of Humanitarian Affairs 
United Nations 
8-14, avenue de la Paix 
CH-1211 Geneva 10 
Switzerland 
Phone: 1-41 22 917 26 61 
Fax: 4 1  22 917 00 23 
Email: sharon.rusu@dha.unicc.org 
If current humanitarian emergency 
in th)! Great Lakes has taught us any- 
thin , it is that we do not have an 
effec ?I 'veintemational system for inter- 
vendon in humanitarian emergencies. 
Following the previous crisis in 
Rwapda in 1994, lessons learned 
stressed the need for an early warning 
system whose warnings would result 
in the initiation of appropriate re- 
spoqses on behalf of those displaced 
by conflict and coercion. How do the 
currht policy-oriented approaches in 
early warning support or hinder the 
huqanitarian community in tran- 
scenging what has been described as 
the dilemma of humanitarism in the 
'90~3 This paper will comment on sev- 
eral current approaches with a view to 
assessing the role of ReliefWeb, a glo- 
bal *formation system developed and 
maiotained by UN Department of 
Humanitarian Affairs as part of its ef- 
fort~ in early warning. 
Day &Tuesday, March 18,1!W- 
C, Synergy of Analyses and 
R&sponses 
C-I., Early Responses 
"The Paradox of Prevention: 
Svccessful Prevention Erases the 
Pr~of of its Success. A Case for A 
New Ethic of Evaluation" 
Jew Guilmette 
International Development Research 
Centre 
250 Albert Street, P.O. Box 8500 
Ottawa, ON, KlG 3H9 
Canada 
Phane: (613) 236-6163 
Fax: (613) 5614349 
Em*. jgurlmette@idrc.ca 
Populations tend to become increas- 
ingly more conservative and risk ad- 
ver$e when it concerns the usage of tax 
revenues. The level of acceptable risk 
prehnium may vary from society to 
society, of course, but there is always a 
me@sure of "non rational" decision 
taking. A critical question is: "how risk 
adSerse is the general population 
when it judges the performance of its 
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, 
government, of its administratioq and 
its civil servant?" And converbely, 
"how deep a risk aversion runs & the 
bureaucracy? In the ~overnme/nt?" 
Consequently "How much of a risk 
premium is Parliament and the Ad- 
ministration ready to charge th$ tax- 
payers to avoid any possibiliiy of 
errors leading to political embdass- 
ment?" Or "how irrational has itb be- 
haviour become?" 
following reflections is to 
decipher the specific 
ality" that has come 
Affairs and Aid decisions in the r cent 
past. Especially as they influenc the 
decision taking for complex pro 4 lems 
such as conflict prevention in Aftiica. I 
will first attempt to explain wh+ pre- 
vention is difficult to undertake. f will 
show why managers refrain fro4 tak- 
ing high risk decisions after they b v e  
been subject to critical comments by 
evaluators and how they learn to cope 
in very specific manners: their gelec- 
tion of choices become increasingly 
more irrational. This is, of coursg, the 
contrary reaction expected b$ the 
evaluators whose primary intenitions 
are to increase rationality in decbsion 
making. Among solutions that qould 
be envisaged, one should spend $ome 
time assessing the impact and rol that 
evaluation plays in the build- 3 p of 
such increasing risk premiums. 4 new 
dimension must be added to the ethi- 
cal code of evaluators which dould 
take into consideration the direct effect 
of the evaluator's own behaviouf." 
"IOM and Early ~esponsed' 
William Hyde 
International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) 
17, route des Morillons 
CH-1211 Geneva 19 
Switzerland 
Phone: 41 22 71 79 111 
Fax: 4 1  22 79 86 150 
Email: hyde@geneva.iom.ch 
The International Organisatio$ for 
Migration (IOM) has the objectibe to 
ensure the orderly migration od per- 
sons in need of international absist- 
ance, IOM is an intergovernmental 
membership organization with 59 
Member States and 48 Observer States. 
IOM enjoys a close working relation- 
ship with many UN agencies, other IOs 
and NGOs working in humanitarian 
assistance. The IOM Emergency Re- 
sponse Unit (ERU) was established to 
(a) develop policies, practices and re- 
sources in order to respond more effec- 
tively to organizationally determined 
emergency needs and (b) to initiate or 
support emergency response efforts. 
Building on relevant materials of oth- 
ers, and adapting and supplementing 
them through IOM's unique experi- 
ences, the ERU has developed several 
course books and guides for internal 
staff training in emergency operations. 
Regular Workshops are facilitated for 
IOM staff both at Headquarters and 
field locations, in order to prepare for 
better response. The ERU participates 
in various UN and other interagency/ 
interorganizational bodies dealing 
with better humanitarian response. 
"Quantitative Approaches to 
Sovereign Risk Analysis: 
Implications for IMF Responses" 
Dane Rowlands 
NPSIA, Carleton University 
Level 2A, Paterson Hall ' 
1125 Colonel By Drive 
Ottawa, ON, K1S 5B6 
Canada 
Phone: (613) 520-2600 ext. 8884 
Fax: (613) 520-2889 
Email. drowltmd@alfred.carleton.ca 
Increased financial integration has 
been accompanied by greater volatil- 
ity of capital flows. For many less 
developed countries (LDCs) this vola- 
tility can have serious economic reper- 
cussions. The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) has been assigned an im- 
portant role in dealing with the prob- 
lem through emergency lending and 
enhanced surveillance duties. Predict- 
ing these crises, however, is difficult. 
The paper begins by outlining the task 
which the IMF has been directed to 
undertake, and why "early warning" 
is essential to fulfilling the mandate. A 
brief review of the literature on the use 
of early warning models to predict fi- 
nancial crises is then provided. The 
paper then provides some preliminary 
evidence on the relative value of sys- 
temic and country-specific analyzes in 
managing IMF resources. 
C-11. Linking Early Warning 
Research to Responses I 
"Towards Response-Oriented Early 
Warning Analysis: Policy and 
Operational Considerations" 
John Cockell 
Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade 
Peace-building and Human Develop 
ment Division (AGP) 
125 Sussex Drive 
Ottawa, ON, KIA OG2 
Canada 
Phone: (613) 995-7800 
Fax: (613) 944-1226 
Email: john.cockeU@extott07.x400.gc.ca 
The connection between conflict early 
warning and early response is here 
explored as a problem of policy- 
relevant analysis. The paper argues 
that while many advocates and re- 
searchers in the early warning field 
decry the absence of "political will," 
the fact remains that much of what 
currently exists as early warning is not 
adequately presented to policymak- 
ers. This involves both clear analysis of 
critical trigger factors, and better tar- 
geting of these analyzes such that they 
are readily utilised by policy end- 
users. The paper argues that current 
conflict early warning practices arenot 
effective in presenting dynamic analy- 
sis that prioritizes factors and presents 
practical options for preventive peace- 
building. To illustrate this argument, a 
framework for early warning analysis 
is outlined in brief. Based on ongoing 
research in the Canadian foreign min- 
istry, this framework focuses on seven 
political early warning categories: 
status of governance/political proc- 
ess; polarisation/potential for conflict; 
structural/societal tension; human 
rights violations; military/arms 
supply; external support; and context- 
specific considerations. Improve- 
ments in policy response-oriented 
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d y s i s  will demand better interac- 
tion between early warning research- 
ers, field monitors, and policy analysts 
in governments, aid agencies, and re- 
gional and international organiza- 
tions. The paper concludes with some 
observations in this regard, and a brief 
review of some existing initiatives 
which perhaps embody this sort of in- 
teraction. Written from the perspective 
of a conflict analyst in the Canddian 
foreign ministry, the paper is informed 
by current policy and ope-rational re- 
quirements for "early response" and 
preventive peacebuilding. 
"Bridging the Gap between 
Warning and Response: Approaches 
to Analyzing Effective Preventive 
Interventions" 
Michael S. Lund 
Center for Strategic and International 
Studies and Creative Associates 
International, Inc. 
Creative Associates 
Greater Horn of Africa Project 
5301 Wisconsin Ave. N.W., Suite 700 
Washington, D.C. 20015 
USA 
Phone: (202) M 8 0 4  ext. 114 
Fax: (202) 363-4771 
Emaik mlund@caii-dc.com 
Early warning data systems have been 
proliferating for some years and are 
gaining validity. But analysis of what 
individual and multiple responses are 
effective in preventing violent con- 
flicts has begun only recently. Until 
high-level pohcymakers have received 
authoritative analyses of what preven- 
tive interventions work under what 
circumstances, we cannot say whether 
their failures to respond arise from lack 
of will or lack of a way. The knowledge 
policymakers can use involves several 
key action-oriented questions- 
when? what? why? who? how? and 
whether?--but existing early warning 
research addresses these only par- 
tially. The paper discusses the units of 
analysis that might be most useful for 
codifying recent preventive experi- 
ence, impact criteria, and two forms of 
such analysis that might provide 
policy relevant answers to the action 
questions. 'Ihese forms are evaluations 
of differing policy tools of intervention 
(e.g., preventive deployment, condi- 
tional development aid), and case- 
studies of successful and unsuccessful 
multi-tooled preventive interventions 
(e.g. Macedonia, Burundi). How this 
knowledge might be incorporated into 
the country-level strategic plans of 
donors and other third parties is dis- 
cussed. The resulting idea of "rolling" 
prevention, rather than the prevailing 
"alarm bell" model, is offered. Evi- 
dence and examples are drawn from 
recent case-study research on paired 
successes and failures, tools' work 
done for the U.S. Greater Horn of Af- 
rica Initiative, and evaluation of devel- 
opment aid's effect on conflict. 
"Armed Conflicts and Human Right 
Violations: PIOOMfs World 
Conflict Map 19%" 
A. P. Schmid and A. J. Jongman 
PIOOM, Leiden 
Wassenaarseweg 52 
2333 AK Leiden 
The Netherlands 
Phone: + 31 (0) 71 527 3861 
Fax: +31(0) 71 527 3788 
Email: sclunid@rulfsw.leidenuniv.nl 
Since 1993 PIOOM has been monitor- 
ing armed conflicts on three levels of 
intensity, using a broader definition of 
war than some other monitors like 
SIPRI (Stockholm) or AKUF (Ham- 
burg). The result is a somewhat less 
optimistic overall assessment of the 
world conflict situation. The paper 
presented explains and comments 
upon a new version of the PIOOM 
Conflict Map, which contains new 
dimensions, partly generated by 
PIOOM itself, partly synthesized from 
other sources. 
The paper discusses the following 
variables and indicators: 
1. Conflict Levels; 
2. Confirmed and Suspected Presence 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction; 
3. Countries Severely Infested with 
Land Mines 
4. Use of Child Soldiers in Conflicts; 
5.United Nations and Regional 
Peacekeeping Operations; 
6.iRefugees and Internally Displaced 
People by Country of Origin; 
7. States of Emergency; 
8. Level of Political Terror under Se- 
verely Repressive Regimes; 
9. Military Rule; 
10, Coups d'Etat and Army Mutinies; 
11. Presence of Systematic Torture; 
12, Annual and Cumulative Fatality 
Figures for High Intensity Con- 
flicts; 
13, UN and other Peacekeeping Opera- 
tions; 
14, Use of the Death Penalty; 
151 Food Security; and 
16; Human Development Index. 
C4II. Linking Early Warning ' 
Research to Responses II 
"Institutions for Managing Ethnic 
Conflicts Selected Cases" 
Japques Bertrand 
The North-South Institute 
5d Murray Street, Suite 200 
Ottawa, ON, KIN 5M3 
CWda 
Phone: (613) 241-3535 
Fw: (613) 241-7435 
E W  jbertran@web.net 
What kinds of actions can help to re- 
duce conflict before it becomes vio- 
lent? There are an array of possible 
xxleasures that exist, from dialogue and 
mediation to sending peacekeeping 
trkmps. Which measures are appropri- 
ale and effective depends on the type, 
the stage and the source of the conflict. 
'IW3 paper focuses spec~fically on eth- 
nic conflict. It argues that, irrespective 
of the sources of ethnic conflict, institu- 
tibns are an important mediating fac- 
tbr in fuelling or reducing the potential 
f ~ r  ethnic violence. It proposes to 
qeepen the research on the institu- 
tjonal sources of conflict to understand 
ow institutional change can alleviate 
!=LNC tensions. The next section situ- 
des the argument within the broader 
debate on peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention. The paper then discusses 
+titution-building in a multi-ethnic 
amtext. It will use the cases of Indone- 
s b  and Nigeria to illustrate the discus- 
don. 
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 ..Spoiler Problems in Peace 
Processes" 
consensus that the coalition forms about 
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of spoiler 
demands and behaviour. 
"An Early Warning about Forecasts: 
Oracle to Academics" 
RECENT REPOI~TS 
Steven Stedman 
African Studies Department, SAlS 
1740 Massachussetts Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
USA 
Phone: (202) 663-5681 
Fax: (202)663-5683 
Email: 
sstedman@mail.jhuwash.jhu.edu 
The greatest danger to peace processes 
comes from spoilers-leaders and parties 
who see peace as a threat to their power, 
world view, and interests, and use stealth 
or violence to undermine attempts to 
achieve it. When spoilers succeed, as they 
did in Angola in 1992 and Rwanda in 
1994, the results are catastrophic. In both 
cases, the casualties of failed peace were 
infinitely higher than the casualties of the 
preceding war. The paper argues that 
spoilers differ by the goals they seek and 
their commitment to achieving those goals. 
External actors have a range of strategies 
available to them, from ones that rely 
heavily on conciliation to ones that rely 
heavily on coercion. The appropriateness 
of a particular strategy depends on the goal 
and commitment of the spoiler and the 
constraints posed by other parties in the 
peace process. Selection of a robust 
strategy requires that the custodian 
overcome various organizational and 
individual blinders that prevent it from 
accurately interpreting the intentions and 
behaviour of the spoiler. Implementation 
of a successful strategy depends on the 
ability of the custo 
dian to create an external coalition for 
peace; the resources that the coalition 
brings to its responsibility; and the 
· Somali Refugees in 
Toronto: A Proffie 
By Edward Opokti-Dapaah 
. ISBN 1-55014-278-x, 130 pp., 
$12.95. 
This is the fll'St comprehensive study of 
Somali refugees in Toronto. It examines the 
social! residential, and lingui,stic char. 
acteristic of Somalis, their participation in 
the local economy, and the activity of So-
mali community organizations. The report 
also contains valuable suggestions and rec. 
ommendations concerning suitable 
more efficient service delivery to this com. 
munity. 
.. ~bodianRefugees in. Oatario: 
An EvaluatWnofResettlemeat 
and Adaptation 
By Janet Mclellan, 
ISBN 1-55014--267-4,142 pp., $12.95. 
'fbismajQrsttidyof CambOdian.~fugeesin 
Ontar10 examines the effects of various 
forms of sponsorship on Cambodian 
reset. tlement. It also focuses and the 
linguistic, economic, educa,tional, training 
and social tUmen$iQ1'!$.of~h~Whqleproce,5§qf 
adap, tation.The delivery of services by 
governmental and NGO agencies as well 
as the 
effectS of the past traumatic experiences of 
genocideandma$$$ta(Vation QJ} Cambo-
t;Uan.refijgeesat~fijUy diScussed. 
· Refugee Families awl ChiJdren: A 
Directory for Service Provide in 
Metto T~rou.to 
Compiled by 
Dr. John Monis and Lydia Sawicki. ISBNJ-
55014-285-2,39 pp., .$6.95. 
'fhis di1'e(:tory isdesignedJor service pro-
.¥iqet$wD9Pio~withJ~geefamiliesand 
children ih Metr9 Toronto. ItS aim is to 
improve service provision through net. 
working and the sharing of training 
Oppor. tUnities. 
AWilable from Centre 
for Refugee Studies 
Dipak K. Gupta 
School of Public Administration and 
Urban Studies 
San Diego State University 
San Diego, CA 92182-D367 
USA 
Phone: (619) 594-4067 
Fax: (619)594-1165 
Email: dgupta@mail.sdsu.edu 
While we develop quantitative models for 
forecasting political and humanitarian 
crises, questions linger about their 
efficacy. In econometrics, there are 
accepted methodologies for determining 
the closeness of fit between the predicted 
and observed values. However, apart from 
the challenges of appropriate data and 
methods of analysis, many of these 
standard techniques either a) tell us little 
about the relative efficiency of our 
forecasting model or b) they do not even 
apply to the prescriptive models. This is 
because, first, after decades of economic 
forecasting, empirical evidence suggest 
that no single method predominates over 
others. Second, since EW models are for 
directing public policy, the predicted 
values are not independent of the observed 
values. That is, if a model places a nation 
on its list of highest risk, which provokes 
the intended policies for averting the crisis 
and the early actions are successful, then 
how do we measure the model's success? 
Therefore, in this paper, I emphasize that 
these models should not be considered as 
"forecasts" and should be taken as 
"warnings." II 
Breaking Ground: The 1956 Hungarian Immigration to 
Canada 
Edited by Robert H. Keyserlingk 
TOrQJ,\to: York Lanes Press, 1993( ISBN 1-55014-232-1, 117 pages, $6.99 
This book is a collection of personal and archival-based memories on the 
selection, transport and settlement of about 40,000 Hungarian refugees in 
Canada in one year.
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